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In this comment, I engage with Chapter 3 of Lucia Rubinelli’s book, which is an
essential contribution to the study of constituent power in the Weimar Republic
and the reception of this idea in the work of the controversial jurist Carl Schmitt
(1888-1985). My thoughts are organized into two sections. In the first, I summarize
Rubinelli’s reading of Schmitt’s understanding of constituent power in Weimar. My
main criticism concerns Rubinelli’s reading of the arbitrary character of constituent
power in Schmitt, which in my view insufficiently reflects Schmitt’s distinction
between dictatorship and despotism. In the second part, I turn to the historical
transition of constituent power that Rubinelli detects between the 19th-century
French lawyers and the Weimar Republic. I point out that there is a missing link
in Rubinelli’s history of Schmitt’s constituent power: the dialogue between the
languages of German state theory (Staatslehre) and French public law (Droit Public)
in the early 20th century.
Carl Schmitt and the Arbitrary Character of
Constituent Power
Rubinelli begins Chapter 3 by stating that to understand Schmitt’s use of constituent
power, one must be aware of his conception of sovereignty as well as of the
challenges the Weimar Republic placed on the idea. Rubinelli argues that Schmitt
develops constituent power to apply his theory of sovereignty to justify the Reich
president’s dictatorship, according to Art. 48 of the Weimar constitution in democratic
terms. According to Rubinelli, for Schmitt, “the sovereign, standing beyond and
above the legal structure, is […] the political entity that can decide over the creation
or the suspension of the constitution” (p. 109). Rubinelli reconstructs Schmitt’s
conception of sovereignty, as it is developed in key works, such as Politische
Theologie (1922), Die Diktatur (1921), Legalität und Legitimität (1932). She explains
how Schmitt’s work emerges as a critique of legal positivism, where his comments
focused on the works of Thoma and Kelsen, who, according to Schmitt, have
sacrificed the essentiality of the constitution (pp. 113–114). For Rubinelli, Schmitt’s
interest in Sieyès derives from the fact that “this allowed him to wage a powerful
critique of the politics of Weimar as well as to sketch a solution for its multiple
crises” (p. 115).
Rubinelli differentiates three characteristics of Schmitt’s reading of constituent power
in Sieyès. First, Rubinelli highlights the arbitrary character that Schmitt ascribes to
the concept of constituent power. She points out that while for Egon Zweig, whose
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seminal Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constituant was published in 1909, constituent
power was a “testimony of the Enlightenment,” for Carl Schmitt it exemplifies
the arbitrary nature of political decisions. For Schmitt, “there was no underlying
rationality to be found in the nation’s constituent power, as this could not be deduced
from any a priori cause” (p. 116). The second characteristic of the constituent power
in Schmitt, according to Rubinelli, is its exceptional character in its omnipotence:
“Being fundamentally discretionary, it does not depend on any norm or value and,
similarly, cannot be bound by any” (p. 116). Schmitt paraphrases Sieyès and
points out that constituent power is unlimited and can do anything because it is not
subordinate to the constitution. Furthermore, Schmitt sees in Sieyès a political theory
in which the nation remains as the bearer of constituent power in an unorganized
and unorganizable way. The third characteristic of constituent power, for Rubinelli,
is its inalienable character. That means that after the sovereign decision, the
constituent power does not disappear; instead, it remains an irreducible force within
the constitutional order. For Schmitt, the idea of constituent power in Sieyès perfectly
expresses the impossibility of constraining sovereignty through legal language. The
distinction between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué is to ensure that the
exercise of delegated powers is limited and constrained by the existing constitution.
Rubinelli concludes that the concept of pouvoir constituant played an essential
role in Schmitt’s writings in Weimar because “it offered him the language through
which he could redefine the democratic principle of popular power to make it
consistent with his understanding of sovereignty” (p. 135). Rubinelli argues that
between Schmitt and Sieyès, there is a parallelism in understanding the nation
such that it supports their political agendas: “what for Sieyès was the Revolution,
for Schmitt was the Weimar Republic” (p. 137). However, Rubinelli believes that
Schmitt misinterprets Sieyès’ theory of sovereignty, which instead of a legitimation
of dictatorship in democratic terms sought to avoid the danger of despotism. For
Rubinelli, this difference between the conception of the pouvoir constituant in Schmitt
and Sieyes went unnoticed in Weimar. Moreover, Rubinelli accepts that Schmitt’s
theoretical proposal has been influential in the work of legal scholars such as
Costantino Mortati in Italy and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde in Germany. Rubinelli
points out, though, that in contrast to these later receptions, the appeal of Schmitt’s
definition of constituent power lies in “his critique of liberalism in general and of
liberal parliamentarianism in particular” (p. 139).
My impression here is that Rubinelli exaggerates the arbitrary character of
constituent power in Schmitt’s theory, considering that he makes a distinction,
in the introduction to Die Diktatur, between dictatorship and despotism. The
dictatorship of the sovereign constituent power (souveräne Diktatur) is not just
any despotism because it proposes that it is legitimized according to its goal, that
is to say, in search of the establishment of a new constitutional order, with a new
subject (Träger) of constituent power, through the suspension and elimination of the
existing norms. In Schmitt’s theological-political approach, this higher instance is not
organized. Moreover, it cannot be reduced to an organization (an organ of the state),
so its commission becomes at the same time its competence. To my mind, this is the
main idea behind a passage that Rubinelli later quotes from Die Diktatur: “From the
infinite, incomprehensible abyss of the force of the pouvoir constituant, new forms
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emerge incessantly, which it can destroy at any time and in which its power is never
limited for good. It can will arbitrarily” (p. 116). Schmitt here does not propose a fully
voluntaristic – in the sense of despotic – character of the constituent power. Rather,
Schmitt offers an “anti-positivist argument” in which constituent power appeals to an
unorganized authority.
A Missing Link in Rubinelli’s History of Constituent
Power: Carl Schmitt and the European Public Law
My other comment concerns the continuity between Chapters 2 and 3, in which
Rubinelli establishes a dialogue between French and German constitutionalism.
In Chapter 2, she explains that the language of constituent power, after Sieyès,
disappears from French constitutional politics. The French constitutions of the 18th-
century integrated the conception of the nation’s sovereignty, which is attenuated
in the constitution of 1795. What Rubinelli does not mention, however, is that
the French constitution of 1848 includes a constituent assembly to reform the
constitution in whole or in part. Here, constituent power reappears, although without
the language of sovereignty. In other words, in the 19th-century, constituent power
changed into a constitutional organ of the French Republic. Rubinelli’s book,
however, does not consider if constituent power could also be exercised through
a non-sovereign constituent assembly. If we accept this possibility, we can define
two historical manifestations of constituent power in France: a sovereign constituent
assembly (1789) and a non-sovereign constituent assembly (1848). When it comes
to the intellectual history transition from the 19th to 20th centuries, Rubinelli seems
to invite us to think that there is a history of a misinterpretation of constituent power
between the 19th-century French lawyers (such as Laboulaye and Berriat-Saint-
Prix) and Schmitt’s reading in Weimar. As I see it, this is not the most plausible
interpretation of the history of constituent power.
In particular, I think Rubinelli’s book overlooks how Schmitt’s language of constituent
power is influenced by a dialogue between German state theory (Staatslehre) and
French public law (Droit Public). Rubinelli recounts how before the Weimar Republic,
jurists such as Robert Redslob and Egon Zweig (who are almost forgotten in the
current literature) analyzed the history of constituent power in their significant works.
The author names this section “France in Germany” (p. 104) and explains that the
work of Theodor Mommsen on the history of the Roman Republic played a key role
in the study of the idea of constituent power at the time. Moreover, Rubinelli argues
that the method of Jellinek’s Allgemeine Staatslehre was fundamental because
Zweig’s book draws on this approach to explain the history of constituent power. In
turn, “Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constituant became the reference point for thinkers
interested in using the idea of constituent power to make sense of popular power
in the Weimar state, including Carl Schmitt” (p. 106). I am not convinced by this
history of constituent power as a connection “Zweig-Schmitt.” In my reading, Schmitt
develops his notion of constituent power in Die Diktatur and Verfassungslehre based
on a language derived from the theory of state organs and their functions. This
perspective comes not from Mommsen and Zweig but the 19th-century German
state theory (Gerber, Laband, and Jellinek) and the public law of the Third French
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Republic (Esmein, Duguit, and Hauriou). In other words, Rubinelli’s history of
constituent power does not reflect that the European public law established a
language of constituent power through the theory of state organs in France and
Germany in the early 20th-century.
Early 20th-century European public law understood constituent power as the
constitution-making function of a state organ in the French constitutions of 1848 and
the constitutional laws of 1875. That at least was the theoretical approach preferred
by French followers of Jellinek like Carré de Malberg. The cases of Redslob and
Zweig that Rubinelli describes are not different from this perspective. In contrast,
Rubinelli takes the discussion about Schmitt in Weimar to the realm of the fusion of
the concepts of sovereignty and constituent power, so Schmitt ends up disconnected
from his European context of constitutional law. In the transition from the 19th to 20th
centuries, constituent power in European public law was not considered sovereign
but a particular function of constitution-making for the organization of state powers.
Thus, we should not assume that Schmitt recovers the language of the sovereignty
of constituent power through the language of popular sovereignty of 18th-century
France. Rather, in Schmitt, there is a sui generis confluence of two movements
that are merged in his understanding of constituent power: French public law (Droit
Public) and German state theory (Staatslehre). Specifically, the Staatslehre idea of
the sovereign state was adopted by Schmitt into the theory of the constituent power
of the Third French Republic. Against this background, I disagree with Rubinelli’s
reading that Schmitt’s idea of a “sovereign constituent power” comes from the
language of 18th-century political theory. The history of constituent power from
European public law perspective becomes complex because it involves developing
a language in Schmitt that goes beyond Sieyès and the French lawyers of the 19th-
century.
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